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Abstract
Increasing evidence support the claim that international trade enhances innovation
and productivity growth through an increase in competition. This paper develops a
two-country endogenous growth model, with firm specific R&D and a continuum of
oligopolistic sectors under Cournot competition to provide a theoretical support to this
claim. Since countries are assumed to produce the same set of varieties, trade openness
makes markets more competitive, reducing prices and increasing quantities. Under
Cournot competition, trade is pro-competitive. Since firms undertake cost reducing
innovations, the increase in production induced by a more competitive market push
firms to innovate more. Consequently, a reduction on trade barriers enhances growth
by reducing domestic firm’s market power.
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades the volume of international trade has increased enormously,
among developed countries since the 80’s and extending to developing countries since
the 90s. This increase in trade volumes is contemporaneous with several attempts to
create regional integration agreements, as for example the European Union, NAFTA and
MERCOSUR. These two related facts have motivated researchers to reopen the old debate
in international trade about the consequences of trade liberalization for productivity and
growth.
Of particular relevance is the recent literature on international trade and heterogeneous
firms, pioneered by Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003). It focuses on the impact of
trade liberalization on industry productivity. Trade liberalization intensifies competition
for rival production factors, pushing the less efficient firms out of the market and, con-
sequently, increasing industry average productivity. Atkeson and Burstein (2010), among
others,1 have considered a similar approach to study the effects of trade liberalization
on firm’s decisions to innovate. They find that the selection effect generated by trade
openness increases firms’ R&D investments.
In this paper, we stress the positive impact on economic growth of the pro-competitive
role of international trade focusing, unlike the previously mentioned literature, on firms’
strategic interaction. Our paper is motivated by the recent empirical studies, at firm and
industry levels, suggesting that globalization has increased both market competition, by
reducing markups, and firm’s R&D investments, leading to gains in aggregate productivity
levels and productivity growth.2
The model builds on the early literature on international trade and strategic interaction
developed by Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983), and the more recently
general equilibrium version by Neary (2009). In a two-symmetric-country economy with
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, countries are assumed to produce the same set of varieties;
each of these varieties is produced by an oligopoly under Cournot competition. As a
consequence, when economies open to trade, it is not the mass of varieties that changes,
but the number of firms competing within each variety. Moreover, firms are assumed
to carry out cost reducing innovations. Under this assumption, innovation incentives
depend positively on quantities, as cost reductions apply to the number of produced units.
Differently from the standard endogenous growth literature, where competition reduces
the incentives of potential entrants to undertake innovation activities, in this framework,
an increase in competition may induce firms to produce more, increasing innovation and
1Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) is another important paper in this literature. See Ederington and Mc-
Calman (2007), Long et al. (2007) and Navas and Sala (2007) for theoretical models studying the effects
of trade liberalization on firms’ decisions to innovate. Impullitti and Licandro (2009) extend the current
paper’s framework to an environment with firm heterogeneity
2The empirical literature on the relation between trade and innovation, as well as the competitive role
of trade for innovation and productivity growth, has been booming recently. See Bloom et al. (2008),
Bugamelli et al. (2008), Bustos (2007), Chen et al. (2009), Eslava et al. (2009), Lileeva and Trefler (2009),
Pavnick (2002), Topalova (2004), among others.
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reducing profits simultaneously.
The paper shows a pro-competitive effect of trade; by reducing markups, trade in-
creases output, innovation and productivity growth. When symmetric economies open
to trade, both domestic and foreign markets suffer from tougher competition, which re-
duces markups and increases the size of the market. Local firms compensate the lost in
domestic market shares by an equivalent gain in the foreign market, letting their global
market shares unchanged. As a direct effect of an increase in competition, firms produce
more. Since incumbent firms undertake innovation activities, returns to innovation depend
crucially on firm’s size. The pro-competitive effect of trade openness has consequently a
positive effect on innovation and productivity growth. Trade barriers reinforce domestic
firms’ market power leading to low innovation and growth. Finally, since the number of
firms affects innovation non-linearly, the paper shows that gains from trade are larger
the less competitive countries are in autarky, since firms are more reactive in such an
environment.
Early attempts to study the impact of trade liberalization on innovation and growth,
as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Devereux and
Lapham, (1994), give little space to competition, because of the monopolistically com-
petitive nature of markets and the assumption that innovation is carried out by potential
entrants. They fail in accounting for the empirical evidence cited above since by assump-
tion markups are constant and incumbent firms do no research activities.3
More recently, a new literature on competition and growth has been developed, in
which incumbents are allowed to upgrade their own technologies. The seminal work by
Aghion et al. (2001) points out the escape from competition effect as an incentive to
innovate in highly competitive environments. Peretto (1999) extends Romer (1990) by
assuming cost-reduction innovations and Bertrand instead of monopolistic competition.
The latter framework has been used to study the relationship between trade openness and
economic growth in two interesting papers: Peretto (2003) and Traca (2002). The first
studies the case of North-North trade, showing that trade liberalization reduces both the
global number of firms and R&D costs due to technological spillovers increasing the incen-
tives to innovate. The second studies the case of trade between a small open developing
economy and the developed world. Openness to trade will have a different impact on inno-
vation and growth depending on the initial productivity gap between both economies. The
developing economy will converge to the global innovation path if the initial productivity
gap is lower enough. Both can be considered as complementary to this work, since they
study the effects of trade liberalization on firm’s incentives to innovate under Bertrand
competition and product differentiation.
An advantage of our framework relies on the fact that an increase in competition is
3In Rivera-Batiz and Romer, for example, openness to trade increases market size and the number
of firms in the same proportion, leaving innovation rents unchanged. It is only under the existence of
technological spillovers that innovation is fostered.
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modeled by an increase in the number of competitors offering the same product.4 Notice
that in this framework, other measures of competition like markups, market shares or
market concentration reduce when the number of firms increases. Moreover, it is important
to say that this paper studies the case of economic integration among similar economies
where openness to trade intensifies competition within existing industries rather than
opening opportunities to profit from comparative advantages, giving access to different
goods produced abroad, something more frequent in the case of North-South trade.
Finally, Cournot competition is particularly suitable for the study of bilateral trade in
industries whose firms supply homogeneous products, which, as pointed out by Bernhofen
(1999), turns out to be a main characteristic of R&D intensive industries like petrochem-
icals and airlines. Griffith et al. (2006) found that in the European Union the chemical
industry was one of the most affected by the Single Market Program, which according
to Bernhofen (1999) also offers quite homogenous products. Other industries as machin-
ery, medical and surgical equipment, telecommunications equipment are not characterized
by high product differentiation. When goods are highly homogeneous, the alternative
assumption of Bertrand competition, is unsuitable since iceberg transportation costs pre-
vents trade to take place acting as a barrier to the entry of foreign firms. In contrast, our
model is able to explain bilateral trade in this environment.5
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model in autarky and
analyzes the main forces driving growth. Section 3 studies costly trade in the case of two
identical economies. Section 4 concludes
2 Autarky
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of consumers of measure L, with instan-
taneous logarithmic preferences defined over two final consumption goods X and Y ,
∞∫
0
e−ρt(lnCxt + lnC
y
t )dt,
4In Aghion et al. (2001), competition is measured by the elasticity of substitution between different
varieties. However, as Koeninger and Licandro (2005) point out, the elasticity of substitution is an element
of the environment reflecting preferences or technology. They claim that changes in the elasticity of
substitution results on different efficient allocations, which may be confounded with the associated change
in competition.
5Another important difference is the general equilibrium perspective adopted in this paper. Peretto
(2003) and Traca (2002) consider strategic interaction within a monopolistic competition structure assum-
ing that the number of firms is small enough to have some market power. However, this implies that firms
should take into account income effects derived from their strategies. Also these firms have market power
in the labor market. These effects are completely ignored in the previous works. Our model avoids that
by assuming a continuum of varieties and n firms producing each variety. Then firms have market-power
on their single market but they are small enough to have any effect on aggregate outcomes.
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where Cxt , C
y
t represent consumption levels. Good Y is an homogeneous good.
6 Good X
is a Dixit-Stiglitz composite good defined in a continuum of industries of measure N :
Cxt =
 N∫
0
xαjtdj

1
α
, α ∈ (0, 1) ,
where xjt represents consumption of good j. Each individual is endowed with one unit of
labour at each point in time. In order to finance R&D activities, firms issue shares, At,
which pay a rate of return rt. Let us take the homogeneous good as the numeraire (i.e.
pyt = 1). The representative consumer budget constraint is given by:
A˙t = wt + rtAt −
N∫
0
pjtxjtdj − Cyt , A0 > 0,
where wt is the wage rate, and pjt is the price of good j.
Good Y is produced by a continuum of firms of measure one with technology:
Cyt = L
y
t , (1)
where Lyt represents labour allocated to this sector. Sector Y is competitive implying that
wt = 1.
Each good j in X is produced by n firms in an oligopolistic environment. A firm i in
j produces using technology (let us omit the subscript j for simplicity)
qit = zitLxit, (2)
where zit is the stock of knowledge, which is assumed to be firm-specific. Firms in X can
also invest in R&D activities leading to a reduction in marginal production costs. The
R&D technology is
z˙it = (Lzit)
γ zit, γ ∈ (0, 1) , (3)
where Lzit represents labor allocated to R&D.
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At any point in time firms in j decide the quantity to supply and the optimal allocation
of workers to both activities, physical production and R&D, taking into consideration other
firms’ strategies. This game belongs to the family of differential games, or repeated games
defined in continuous time, in which past actions affect current payoffs. Two different
concepts of Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium have been proposed in the literature, open-
loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria. In an open-loop Nash equilibrium firms decide
at time t = 0 the optimal path of strategies taking other firms’ path strategies as given.
6The existence of a traditional good allows for the reallocation of labor to the R&D sector without
necessarily reducing labor assigned to composite good production. A similar result would arrive under the
assumption of an elastic labor supply as in Aghion el al (2001) but this alternative simplifies the model.
Although important, the effect of trade openness on employment is not an issue in this paper.
7Since we are focusing on the effects on growth of a pure increase in competition, no technological
spillovers are assumed.
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Instead, in a closed loop Nash equilibrium firms decide at every period the optimal strategy
taking as given the strategy of their opponents. Since our model fulfill the conditions for
both type of equilibrium to coincide, we focus on open loop equilibria allowing us to apply
standard optimal control theory techniques.8
Let ai = [qiT,LziT ] , ∀ T ≥ t be firm’s i strategy, where [qiT,LziT ] are the time-paths of
output and R&D workers, and let us call Ωi, the set of strategies of firm i. Let Vi be the
value of firm i when the v firms in the market, n ≥ 2, play strategies An = [a1,a2,......., an] .
Definition 1 At time t, An = [ai, a−i] is an open loop Nash equilibrium if
Vi [An] ≥ Vi
[
A′n
] ≥ 0,
where A′n = [a′i, a−i] , ∀ a′i ∈ Ωi.
This condition implies that the optimal time path of strategies ai maximizes the value
of firm i taking as given other firms’ strategies, (a−i), and that the firm value has to be
non-negative.
2.1 Solving for the autarkic equilibrium
Consumers solve the standard optimal control problem defined above. The optimal con-
ditions are
Ext = E
y
t = Et, (4)
E˙t
Et
= rt − ρ, (5)
pjt =
(
LEt
PtNxjt
)1−α
Pt, (6)
where Ext , E
y
t are individual expenditures in goods X, Y , respectively, i.e.,
Ext =
N∫
0
pjtxjtdj
and Eyt = C
y
t . In the following, we use the notation Et to refer to both. The price index
of the composite good X is given by
Pt =
 N∫
0
p
α
α−1
jt dj

α−1
α
Firm i producing good j solves the problem:
Vis = max
∫ ∞
s
Rs,t
(
(pjt − z−1it )qit − Lzit
)
dt, s.t. (7)
8See Fershtman and Muller (1982), Fershtman (1987) and Reinganum (1982). A non technical summary
can be found in Cellini and Lambertini (2004).
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pjt =
(
LEt
PtNxjt
)(1−α)
Pt
xjt =
n∑
i=1
qit
z˙it = (Lzit)
γzit,
where γ ∈ (0, 1), zi0 > 0 and Rs,t = e−
R t
s rτdτ is the usual market discount factor. Deriving
first order conditions, rearranging terms and applying symmetry, we get:
qt = θlztEt, (8)
1 = γvt(Lzt )
γ−1zt, (9)
z−2t qt
vt
+ (Lzt )
γ =
−v˙
v
+ rt, (10)
where vt is the costate associated with variable zt and θ ≡ n−1+αn is the inverse of the
markup rate. We restrict the analysis to symmetric equilibria. In particular, we assume
the initial stock of knowledge is equal for all firms in all sectors, i.e. zi0 = z0∀i in all j. As
it can be seen in the last term of equation (8), the relevant scale is the number of workers
per firm, l ≡ LnN .
The left hand side of condition (10) is the marginal gain of accumulating one more
unit of knowledge, and it can be decomposed in two parts: the first consisting on the
reduction in marginal production costs, which are proportional to the quantity supplied,
and the second representing learning by doing in research. Notice that the benefit of
a cost-reduction innovation depends on the quantity produced, since it determines the
amount of saved resources following such an innovation.
Given that the quantity produced determines the innovation effort, the way in which
quantities are decided is fundamental for growth. This is in equation (8). In particular,
we are interested in understanding the effect of a change in the number of firms on the
incentives to innovate. In our model, an increase in the number of firms generates two
different, opposite forces. On the one hand, the market share of each firm reduces, which
can be seen in the last term of condition (8), since l goes down. This is the size effect
or the market share effect. On the other hand, the markup 1θ depends positively on the
perceived elasticity of demand n1−α . Consequently, an increase in the number of firms has
a positive effect on quantities by increasing the inverse of the markup, represented by the
first term on the right hand side of (8). This is the competition effect.
The labor market clearing condition is
nN(Lxt + L
z
t ) + L
y
t = L. (11)
The financial market-clearing condition implies that the aggregate asset demand LAt is
equal to the stock market value of firms:
LAt = nNVt. (12)
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Finally, let us impose the market-clearing condition in sector Y :
LEyt = L
y
t . (13)
2.2 Balanced growth path
At a Balanced Growth Path (BGP) equilibrium all variables are constant a part from
qt, zt, vt and pt, which all grow at constant rates. The following proposition shows existence
and unicity of a BGP.
Proposition 1 An interior BGP exists and is unique
Proof. Combining (3), (8), (9) and (10), under L˙zt = 0, we get
θγ(Lz)γ−1lE = ρ.
Substituting the latter equation, (2), (4), (8), and (13) into the labor market-clearing
condition (11), it becomes
f(Lz) ≡
(
1 + θ
θ
)
ρ
γ
(Lz)1−γ + Lz = l. (14)
Since f(.) is monotonically increasing, and satisfies the limit conditions limx→0 f(x) = 0
and limx→l f(x) > l, existence and uniqueness derive directly from the intermediate value
theorem.
In Appendix B, we also show the economy jumps to its BGP at the initial time.
2.3 Output growth
In this economy, production in sectors Y and X do not grow at the same rate. Consistent
with national accounts, let us define growth by the mean of a Divisia index, meaning that
the growth rate of real output is equal to the growth rate of both final sectors weighted by
the share of each sector on nominal output. Since the homogeneous sector is not growing,
and preferences are logarithmic, the growth rate of output is
g =
1
2
q˙
q
=
1
2
z˙
z
=
1
2
(Lz)γ .
Technical progress only affects sector X, making the growth rate depend on the amount
of labor allocated to research in this sector.
θ is the inverse of the markup and may be seen as a measure of the degree of compe-
tition. By differentiating (14), the growth rate can be easily shown to be increasing in θ.
This is what we have referred before as the competition effect. There is a positive relation
between the degree of competition and the perceived elasticity of demand, which depends
positively on both the number of firms n and the elasticity of substitution α. As we have
commented before, an increase on θ leads firms to increase the quantity produced. Given
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that innovation can be exploited in a large number of produced units, firms increases
innovation too. This result is the opposite to that found in monopolistic competitive
models, where a rise in the elasticity of substitution decreases the markup and reduces the
innovation rate. When incumbents carry out process innovation, the scale of operation
becomes an important determinant of R&D decisions. The rise in the perceived elasticity
of demand increases the quantity supplied and therefore the return to innovation.
3 Free trade
Let us assume that countries are identical. Since both economies are equal in factor
endowments and initial stocks of knowledge no pattern of specialization from trade is
observed and all the gains from trade comes from an increase in competition.
Let us assume that transportation costs are of the iceberg type; precisely, (1 + τ)
units of the product must be shipped in order to serve 1 unit abroad, where τ ≥ 0 is the
percentage of total production that disappears in the process of shipping. Notice that for
foreign firms selling in the domestic market, the markup in autarky has to be larger than
the transportation costs, meaning that there is trade iff 1 + τ < 1θ . Let us assume it in
the next.
Under international trade, firms are able to serve both markets so some clarification
about the notation must be made. Let us define the quantity qcht as the quantity supplied
by a firm located in country h to market c, where c, h ∈ {A,B}. That is qABt is the
quantity supplied by the B-firm to the A-market. Whenever only one superscript appears
it indicates that the variable is defined for that economy, that is, ExAt would be the
expenditure assigned to X by households located in country A.
Under symmetry, first order conditions for country A under free trade are:(
lExAt
qAAt + q
A
Bt
)1−α
PAt
(
(n− (1− α)) qAAt + nqABt
n(qAAt + q
A
Bt)
)
= (zAt )
−1, (15)
(
lExBt
qBBt + q
B
At
)1−α
PBt
(
(n− (1− α)) qBAt + nqBBt
n(qBAt + q
B
Bt)
)
= (zAt )
−1(1 + τ), (16)
1 = γvAt (L
zA
t )
γ−1zAt , (17)(
zAt
)−2 (qAAt + (1 + τ)qBAt)
vAt
+
(
LzAt
)γ
=
−v˙At
vAt
+ rt. (18)
Conditions (17), (18) are identical to conditions (9), (10) except from the fact that in
(18), when computing the return on innovation, firms take into account quantities supplied
to both markets. Conditions (15), (16) determine the optimal quantities supplied in each
market and are analogous to condition (8), but one for each market. Notice that firms do
not supply the same quantities to both market. B-firms solve an identical problem and
their first order conditions are equal to those of country A but changing the subscripts
and the superscripts, from B to A and viceversa.
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In order to complete the definition of an equilibrium allocation, market clearing con-
ditions need to be added:
nN(Lxht + L
zh
t ) + L
yh
t = L, h = {A,B} , (19)
LAht = nNV
h
t , h = {A,B} , (20)
L(EyAt + E
yB
t ) = L
yA
t + L
yB
t . (21)
3.1 Balanced growth path
A balanced growth path for this economy is a symmetric equilibrium in which variables
Lxt , L
y
t , L
z
t , Et, E
y
t , rt, q
y
t are constant and variables zt, q
A
At = q
B
Bt, q
A
Bt = q
B
At, vt, pt grow
at a common constant rate (we have omitted some supraindexes).
Proposition 2 Under τ ∈ [0, 1−αn−1+α ], a balanced growth path exists and is unique
Proof. See Appendix A.
As shown in the appendix, equilibrium conditions can be reduced to the following equation
in Lz
f∗(Lz) ≡
(
1 + θ∗
θ∗
)
ρ
γ
(Lz)1−γ + Lz = l, (22)
which is in fact the same equation than in autarky but with θ∗given by:
θ∗ =
(2n− 1 + α)(2(1− α)(1 + τ) + τ2(1− α− n))
n(2 + τ)2(1− α) . (23)
The question is whether the growth rate of technological progress is higher under free
trade than under autarky or, in another terms, whether θ∗ ≥ θ.
Proposition 3 Under τ ∈ [0, 1−αn−1+α ], θ∗ ≥ θ.(The growth rate under free trade is always
higher than in autarky)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Trade openness has no effect on the right hand side of (22) because neither local resources
nor the local number of producers change. In other words, the increase in the number of
competitors in each country has no size effect, since firms are selling in both countries.
However, the increase in the number of competitors has an effect through competition. In
the extreme case τ = 0, the markup takes the same functional form as in autarky, but
with 2n instead of n as the number of competitors. A reduction in markups puts the
competition effect at work as already explained in the previous section. Even if firms are
selling less in their domestic market than under autarky, the global quantity they supply
is larger, because of the competition effect. Therefore, openness to international trade
leads to more innovation and growth. Proposition 4 shows that the competition effect also
works under trade frictions. It is important to notice that this result is not driven by any
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scale effect, since the number of workers per firm l is equal in both cases, under autarky
and trade openness. Now, we proceed to discuss some comparative statics.
Transportation costs are a barrier for foreign competitors reinforcing the market power
of domestic firms and making the competition effect less effective, as shown in the propo-
sition below.
Proposition 4 An increase in transportation costs has a negative impact on the rate of
innovation
Proof. It can be easily shown by differentiating (23) with respect to τ .
Finally, the difference between R&D investment in both regimes, autarky and free trade,
is small when the number of firms is large. This is due to the fact that n has a non-linear
impact on produced quantities; while for a small number of firms the increase in quantities
due to trade openness is important, for a large number of firms it has a very small impact.
The main mechanism operates through the perceived elasticity of demand and its effect
on the markup; increasing the number of firms affects the growth rate of productivity
through the inverse of the markup, which derivative with respect to n decreases with n.
Notice that there are no gains from trade in the extreme case of n ≥ 1+ττ (1− α), since free
trade requires τ ≤ 1−αn−1+α . In the limit, when n approaches 1+ττ (1− α), the competition
effect vanishes.
4 Conclusions
This paper develops an endogenous growth model with firm specific innovation, Cournot
competition on a continuum of oligopolistic markets and free trade between identical
economies. It shows that international trade induces growth in participant countries
through an increase in competition; openness to trade generates a reduction in markups,
inducing firms to innovate more to profit from the associated increase in market size. This
research reinforces the view that at least for the case of developed countries trade openness
enhances innovation and growth through a pro-competitive effect.
By restricting the analysis to identical economies, the present paper may be seen as a
contribution to the understanding of the growth effect of regional integration agreements
among similar countries, as it is the case of France and Germany in the European Union.
A natural extension will be the study of economies with different initial conditions (i.e.
different technological levels) or different factor endowments. This would make possible the
study of the interaction between developed and developing economies, as it is the case of
Mexico and the US in NAFTA or the accession of Ireland and Spain to the EU. Differences
in the initial stock of knowledge determine the initial differences in marginal costs and
market shares; differences in market size depend upon differences in factor endowments.
The pro-competitive effect of trade in both economies will be determined by the interaction
of these two forces. In the extreme case of unilateral trade policies, we expect a reduction
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of growth rates in the liberalizing country since the increase in competition coming from
this policy is more than offset by the creation of an artificial comparative advantage to
foreign firms. However, preferential trade liberalization agreements, will enhance growth
in the liberalizing countries reducing growth in protectionist third countries due to the
fact that the reduction of trade barriers between the two liberalizing countries increases
competitiveness of their firms in both economies with respect to third country firms.9
A final interesting extension would allow for sectorial differences. In this case, it would
be possible to identify sectors having larger gains from trade. Considering, for simplicity,
intersectorial independence, we suspect that the less competitive sectors will have larger
gains from trade.
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A Free Trade
Proposition 3 Under τ ≤ 1−αn−1+α , a balanced growth path exists and is unique
Proof. Under symmetry, zAt = z
B
t = zt, q
A
At = q
B
Bt = qt and q
B
At = q
A
Bt = q˘t, for all t.
Taking condition (15) for both countries, we get
(n− 1 + α)qt + nq˘t
nqt + (n− 1 + α)q˘t =
(
1
1 + τ
)
,
implying
q˘t =
(1− α)(1 + τ)− nτ
1− α+ nτ qt, (24)
which requires
τ ≤ 1− α
n− 1 + α
to q and q˘ be simultaneously positive.
Under symmetry, ExAt = E
xB
t = Et, P
A
t = P
B
t = Pt and pjt = pt for all j and t,
implying that the inverse demand function (6) for any variety produced in any country
becomes
pt =
(
LE
n(qt + q˘t)
)1−α
Pt =
lE
qt + q˘t
,
14
the last equality follows from the definition of the price index P. Substituting the latter
condition and (24) in (15) and rearranging terms, it follows
qt =
(
(1− α+ nτ)(2n− 1 + α)
n(2 + τ)2(1− α)
)
ztlE (25)
q˘t =
(
((1− α)(1 + τ)− nτ)(2n− 1 + α)
n(2 + τ)2(1− α)
)
ztlE. (26)
At the balanced growth path, rt = ρ from (5), and z˙z = (L
z)γ from (3). From (17), (18),
(25) and (26), we obtain:
γ (Lz)γ−1 θ∗lE = ρ
where, by analogy with the autarky case,
θ∗ =
(2n− 1 + α)(2(1− α)(1 + τ) + τ2(1− α− n))
n(2 + τ)2(1− α) .
From the labor market clearing condition (19),
Lx + Lz +
Ly
nN
= l.
From (21) and (4), Ly = LE; from (2), q+ (1 + τ) q˘ = zLx. Substitution q and q˘ by their
expressions in (25) and (26), we get
f∗(Lz) ≡ (1 + θ
∗
θ∗
)
ρ
γ
(Lz)1−γ + Lz = l,
i.e., is the same equation as in the autarkic model but with θ∗ instead of θ. Interiority
and uniqueness of the solution is therefore ensured by looking at the autarkic balanced
growth path proof.
Proposition 4 Under τ ≤ 1−αn−1+α , θ∗ ≥ θ
Proof. From the definition of θ∗ and θ,
θ∗ − θ = (2n− 1 + α)(2(1− α)(1 + τ) + τ
2(1− α− n))
n(2 + τ)2(1− α)
−n− 1 + α
n
,
=
(1− α)2(1 + τ) + τ2n(1− α− n)
n(2 + τ)2(1− α) .
It can be easily shown that the r.h.s. is decreasing in τ , with θ∗ − θ = 0 when τ is at its
maximum value 1−αn−1+α .
B Stability analysis under autarky
Let us combine equations (2), (8) and (11) to get
Lx = θlE
1 + θ
θ
Lx + Lz = l,
15
implying
E =
l − Lz
(1 + θ) l
.
By logdifferentiation,
E˙
E
= − L
z
l − Lz
L˙z
Lz
.
From (5),
r = ρ− L
z
l − Lz
L˙z
Lz
. (27)
Adding (3) and (10), we get
z˙
z
+
v˙
v
= r − q
z
1
zv
= r − γθl (Lz)γ−1E = r − θγ
1 + θ
(Lz)γ−1 (l − Lz) . (28)
The second equality emerges after substituting qz and
1
zv by their expressions in (8) and
(9), respectively, and the last one after substituting the expression for E computed just
above. Differentiating (9)
z˙
z
+
v˙
v
= (1− γ) L˙
z
Lz
.
Substituting it and (27) in (28), we get
L˙z
Lz
=
(
ρ− θγ
1 + θ
(Lz)γ−1 (l − Lz)
)(
l − Lz
(1− γ) l + γLz
)
.
The sign of the second term in the r.h.s. is positive since Lz ≤ l. The unique interior
steady state, let us denote it by L∗, is obtained by equalizing the first element of the r.h.s.
to zero (condition (14)). As it can be easily seen, L˙z ≤ 0 for Lz ∈ (0, L∗) and L˙z ≥ 0 for
Lz ∈ (L∗, l), implying that the interior steady state is unstable. Consequently, the only
rational expectation equilibrium is Lzt = L
∗ for all t ≥ 0.
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